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Abstract 
In this paper, Katz and Searle's controversy over literal meaning will be discussed in the 
light of relevance theory. Although their notions are drastically different, these notions 
have their places in utterance interpretation processes and there is no point in deciding 
whose notion is right. Katz's notion can be characterised as a relevance notion logical form 
which is an output of the hearer's knowledge of grammar, while Searle's, propositional 
form, which is a contextually enriched logical form. 1 will introduce a relevance notion 
literal interpretation which can not only be contrasted with figurative use, but also with 
non-figurative loose use (e.g. France is hexagonai). 
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1. Introduction 
Literalness is often talked about in much of the literature. For example, Searle 
(1 968) identifies literal sentence meaning with the linguistic propositional 
meaning of a sentence, as opposed to intended speaker meaning which is iden- 
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tified with what the speaker says in uttering this sentence.' Searle (1975) 
states that what the speaker literally says is sentence meaning while what the 
speaker actually cornmunicates is speaker's utterance meaning. Further, Grice 
(1975) makes a distinction between an utterance's literal rneaning and the 
meaning which is actually communicated by the speaker.2 
So it seems that literal meaning cuts across sentence and utterance mean- 
ing, as here we have literalsentence meaning as in Searle (1968) and literal 
utterance meaning as in Grice (1975). Both of these literal rneanings are impor- 
tant in pragmatics as they fall in the explicit content of communication which 
is contrasted with the implicit content. Undoubtedly people perceive the expli- 
citlimplicit distinction: e.g. the point in an indirect answer to a question lies 
with the implicit content rather than the explicit content of the utterance. 
Then, an attempt to explicate the term literal meaning is in fact an attempt 
to explicate the explicit content of an utterance, the leve1 which is required for 
a serious pragmatic theory. 
In this paper, we will investigate what the literal meaning of a sentence is, 
as well as whether the speaker is saying the sentence literally or not. The inves- 
tigation is necessary as the existing ~nderstandin~s of literal meaning are various. 
We will mainly focus on Katz and Searle's controversy over the literal meaning 
of a sentence as their notions of literal meaning have their hnctions in utterance 
interpretation processes explicated in !he light of relevance theory, which is a 
pragmatic theory of utterance interpretation: 
2. Katz and Searle's controversy over the literal meaning of a sentence 
Katz (1977) put forward the notion of the meaning in azero or null context, 
and argued that this is the literal meaning of a sentence. According to Katz 
(1977), the literal meaning of a sentence is deterrnined by the meanings of its 
component words and its structure. 
Searle (1 978), however, cast doubt on the very notion of meaning in the zero 
context, i.e. the gramrnatically determined literal meaning of a sentence. Searle 
(1978: 208) criticizes the received opinion that the literal meaning of a sen- 
1. The propositional meaning of a sentence is a meaning which designates what a sentence 
says about the world. The same sentence can express different propositional meanings on 
different occasions. For example, he ir hungry can on one occasion describes the state of 
affairs that John Smith is hungry at the time of uttering the sentence, and on another, that 
the male lion in the cage is hungry at the time of uttering the sentence. On  the contrary, dif- 
ferent sentences can express one and the same propositional meaning. For examplc, the 
sentence I t i  Wednesday today uttered on a Wednesday expresses the same propositional 
meaning as It will be Wednesday tomorrow uttered on a Tuesday. 
2. It is interesting to note that the distinction between an utterance's literal meaning and the 
speaker's intended meaning is the one that most people consider to be the semanticslprag- 
matics distinction. For example, if someone says Can youpass me thc salt?, the utterance's 
literal meaning is that the speaker is inquiring about the hearer's ability to pass the salt. 
But what the utterance really does is to ask the hearer to pass the salt, of course. 
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tence is the meaning that it has in the zero context by presenting the follow- 
ing argument. 
Even if the speaker of (1) means exactly and literally that the cat is on the 
mat, its truth-conditions3 will vary with the contexts of its literal utterance, 
despite the claim that the literal meaning of (1) is context free.4 
(1) The cat is on the mat. (Searle 1978: 2 10) 
Searle's argument goes as follows. Suppose that the cat which is on the mat 
is floating in outer space where there is no up-down orientation and we some- 
times see the cat and mat upside-down or obliquely. In this situation, can we 
still say ( l ) ?  Or  rather, is (1) true? Intuitively we believe that (1) should be 
uttered when the cat is above the mat, i.e., where the two objects are within 
the earth's gravitational field. Now if we take the literal meaning as the con- 
text-free meaning of ( l ) ,  then the assumption that there is an up-and-down 
orientation must be specified in the sentence-meaning of (1). However, this 
is most unlikely because the appearance of the world i.e., the existence of up- 
down orientation is part of our world knowledge rather than part of the mean- 
ing of the word on. 
Then, the assumption that there is an up-down orientation, must be spec- 
ified in the context in which (1) is uttered and the truth-value of (1) is tested 
against this background. Hence, Searle (1978: 214) argues that even for a large 
3. The truth-conditions of a sentence are the conditions which the world must meet for the 
sentence to be true. Knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing how the world has to 
be for that sentence to be true, i.e., knowing the truth-conditions of a sentence. For exam- 
ple, the hearer will know the truth-conditions of (i) when the logicai form encoded is com- 
pleted into a fully propositional form via reference assignment (who the word she refers to 
in the world), disambiguation (which senses of mean is intended), etc. 
(i) She was mean. 
The fully propositionai form might be something like (ii) on one occasion, or some- 
thing like (iii) on another. 
(ii) Mary Smith was mean (as not beinggenerow) at t. 
(iii) Ma y Brown was mean (as being discreditable in her behaviour) at t. 
(t = some identifiable time span) 
In order for (ii) and (iii) to be true, the world has to meet the following truth-con- 
ditions (iia-b) and (iiia-b) respectively and knowing the meaning of the sentence (i) is 
knowing (ia-b) on one occasion, and (iia-b) on another. 
(i) a Mary Smith existed at t. 
b Mary Smith was not generous at t. etc. 
(ii) a Mary Brown existed at t. 
b Mary Brown was discreditable in her behaviour. etc. 
4. Searle (1978: 219) gives another example to argue against Kaa's context-free literal mean- 
ing. An arithmetical sentence such as threeplusfour equals seuen is often considered as a 
true statement independent of any context. Even here, certain assumptions seem to be made 
in order to apply the literal meaning of the sentence, as demonstrated in the following 
Wittgenstein's example: 
A = 3 , B = 4 , b u t A + B = 5 A B  
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class of unambiguous sentences such as (l),  the notion of literal meaning has 
application only relative to a set of background assumptions. Searle (1978: 
214) further argues that due to various background assumptions the truth- 
conditions of the sentence will vary, and a sentence might not have determin- 
ate truth-conditions if some background assumptions are absent. 
So what Searle is arguing against is the view that the literal meaning of a sen- 
tence is entirely determined by the meanings of its parts and their syntactic 
combination in the sentence. In order to support his argument, Searle (1980) 
gives further examples (2)a-e: 
(2) a. Bill cut the grass. 
6. The barber cut Tom ? hair. 
c. Sally cut the cake. 
d. Ijust cut rny skin. 
e. The tailor cut the cloth. 
Suppose that the word cut in (2)a-e is used literally, i.e., non-metaphori- 
cally, and non-ironically. Although the same word cutis used in each senten- 
ce, the sort of thing that constitutes cutting the grass is quite different from 
e.g. the sort of thing that constitutes cutting a cake. The word cut in cuthng the 
grass usually means mowing and in cutting a cake, slicing. 
So if Bill is told to cut the grass and he slices the grass with a knife, or if 
Sdly is told to cut a cake and she uses a lawn-mower, this is not what the speak- 
er meant by her literal and serious utterance of the sentences (2a) and (2c). 
Here our background assumptions, or our world knowledge concerning cut- 
ting thegrass and cutting a cake partly determine the meanings of the sentences 
(2a) and (2c). And Katz's idea that context-free sentence meaning done deter- 
mines the literal meaning of a sentence, does not hold. 
Now some might argue that the word cut, like the word bank is, in fact, 
ambiguous and the context-free meaning of e.g. (2a). determines several dis- 
crete sets of truth-conditions from which the truth-conditions are contextually 
or pragmatically chosen. However, as (3) shows, the word cut has a common 
sernantic content roughly involving the notion of a physical separation by 
means of the pressure of some more or less sharp instrument: 
(3) General Electric has jwt announced the development of a new cutting ma- 
chine that can cutgrass, hair, cakes, skin and cloth. (Searle 1980: 222) 
The word bank meaning financia1 institution and side of a river, on the 
other hand, does not have such a common semantic content. So we cannot 
claim that the word cutis several ways ambiguous. 
So the differences in the meaning of the word cut in (2a-e) have to be attri- 
buted to our background assumptions i.e., contextual information, and the 
truth-conditions of each sentence are determined not only by the combina- 
tion of words and syntax of the sentence, but by contextual assumptions. That 
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is, the determination of the literal meaning of a sentence necessarily involves 
contextual information. 
Let us consider the following example: 
(4) A: I'm biger than you. (5) A: bigger (A,B) 
B: lin biger than you. B: bigger (B,A) 
(Olson & Hildyard 1983: 49) 
Olson & Hildyard (1 983: 49) in their paper Writing and Literal Meaning 
argue that (4A-B) uttered by two children are not synonymous in terms of 
their literal meanings as represented in (5A-B) where the references A and B are 
assigned to Iand you. Now, Katz's notion of context-free literal meaning would 
have to consider (4A-B) as being synonymous because without contextual 
information (5A-B) cannot be recovered, i.e., the assignment of reference can- 
not be done out of the context. 
Naturally, in the ordinary sense of literal meaning we consider (4A-B) to 
mean different things literally. And hence, we might want to follow Searle's 
view of literal meaning since otherwise we have to see the argument benveen 
the two boys being of redundant nature. 
Does this, however, mean that we want to completely abandon the con- 
text-free literal meaning, the notion claimed by Katz? The answer is no. Let 
us now consider the following: 
(6) A: Didyour treatmentfor stammering work? 
B: Peter Piper picked a peck ofpickLedpepper. 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986: 178) 
The utterance (6B) is relevant as an answer to A's question. That is, (6B) 
gives rise to an implicature that the treatment seems to have worked. However, 
(6B) does not have the sentence meaning that the treatment seems to have 
worked. 
Now in Searle's sense of literal meaning, (6B) has to have an application 
against some contextual background in order for its truth-conditional content 
to be recovered. It is true that (6B) is processed automatically by the hearer's 
knowledge of grammar and the hearer might access his background assump- 
tions concerning pickled peppers. However, these background contextual 
assumptions are not used to determine the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance i.e., what Searle claims, the literal meaning. This is because the 
semantic content of (6B) is not communicated to the hearer and for exarnple 
no referent can be assigned to Peter Piper. 
Here we do not want to say that the literal meaning of (6B) is the impli- 
cature that the treatment seems to have worked, nor do we want to say that 
the literal meaning of (6B) is that Peter Piper picked a peck of pickled pepper. 
This is because, as was mentioned, the utterance is chosen not for its seman- 
tic content but for its phonological properties. That is, the speaker does not 
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communicate its semantic content and in fact she could have produced any 
other tongue twister in order to communicate the same message. 
However, we cannot deny that (6B) has some semantic content although 
it does not constitute part of the message communicated. Now Searle's notion 
of literal meaning cannot capture the semantic content of (6B). However, 
Katz's notion of context-free meaning can explain the semantic content of (6B) 
because (6B) is a grammatically correct English sentence, and following Fodor 
(1983), grammar would automatically process the utterance, deriving a context- 
free grammatically determined meaning. 
Now what underlies the different conceptions of Katz and Searle is two 
different notions of semantic competence. Katz's semantic competence is con- 
ceived of as a component of linguistic competence, i.e. grammar, like syntac- 
tic competence, and is autonomous from other mental capacities. Searle's 
semantic competence, on the other hand, seems to be conceived of as know- 
ledge of truth-conditions. Knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing how 
the world has to be for that sentence to be true. 
These are very different notions of semantics, but a psychologically ade- 
quate theory of utterance interpretation will give a place to both of these con- 
cepts. 1 would now like to give a relevance-based account of how Searle and 
Katz's notions of literal meaning have their places in utterance interpretation 
processes. 
3. Katz and Searle's notions of literal meaning and relevance theory 
In relevance theory Katz's notion of grammatically determined context-free 
meaning and Searle's notion of contextually enriched truth-conditional mean- 
ing are manifested as logicalform and propositionalform respectively. The lat- 
ter is a semantically complete logical form and is capable of being true or false, 
whereas the former is an incomplete logical form which our grammar decodes 
an utterance into. This incomplete logical form can then be completed into 
a propositional form on the basis of contextual information. 
A logical form, whether truth-evaluable or not, is technically a well 
formed formula which can undergo logical processing, and therefore play an 
important role in cognition. Grammar decodes a natural language sentence 
into an inc:omplete logical form, and this is comparable to KatzS notion. Here, 
we use the term logicalform to mean incomplete logicalform which is then con- 
textually enriched into a complete logical f ~ r m . ~  Complete logicalform is a 
truth-conditional propositional form and this is comparable to Searle's notion. 
5. This is based on Fodor's modular approach to human cognition. By modular, he means 
that the mind has a variety of specialized systems individuated by virtue of their compu- 
tational properties. Fodor calls these special-purpose systems input ystems, which process 
visual, auditory, linguistic, and other perceptual information. The output of these input 
systems is fed into the central systems which integrate the input information with back- 
ground information stored in memory, performing inferences on it, and coming to con- 
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For example, grammar decodes (4A-B) into a logical form, something like 
that the speaker is bigger than the hearer, which does not distinguish (4A) 
from (4B). The hearer, then, using contextual information, pragmatically enri- 
ches the logical form into truth-evaluable propositional form representations 
such as (5A-B). Thus, at the leve1 of propositional form, (4A) and (4B) cannot 
be said to be synonymous. 
In (6B), on the other hand, the grammar decodes the utterance into an 
incomplete logical form. And as we mentioned, there is no use of background 
assumptions here to establish who Peter Piper is. The semantic content of (6B) 
is not to be pragmatically enriched into a propositional form because it is not 
an intended meaning communicated to the hearer. However, the utterance 
(6B), as we mentioned, has semantic content and this can be captured as 
logicalform in relevance theory. 
Now Searle's and Katz's notions have their places in utterance interpretation 
processes. That is, our grammar decodes an utterance into a logical form, Katz's 
notion, which is then enriched into a propositional form, Searle's notion. There 
is no dispute to be resolved here; both concepts have a role to play in a full 
theory of utterance interpretation, and whether one or the other, or neither 
of these concepts is called literal meaning, is a matter of no interest. 
The notion of literal meaning is usually employed as a contrast with figurative 
meaning. So, for example, the meaning of john is v e y  clever can be taken to be 
the literal ascription of cleverness to John, or something quite different if it is 
taken as ironical. But it is not sentences, linguistic objects, which are loose (to 
be discussed later) or metaphorical, or hyperbolical or ironic, or figurative in 
any other way. It is the use of these sentences as utterances, as communication. 
Thus the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence does not enter into 
any distinction with any other variety of a meaning that a sentence can have. 
If the concept of the literal meaning of a sentence makes any sense at all, it is 
simply as the meaning of a sentence and so it is Katz's notion - linguistic mean- 
ing. Searle's notion pertains to utterance meaning, not sentence as he is con- 
sidering sentences in use. 
In relevance theory, we do not talk about the literal meaning of a sentence but 
the notion literal interpretation has its place. This notion is important, not 
because it can be contrasted withjgurative use, but because it can be contrast- 
ed with loose use of language, which prevails in our use of language. In this 
theory, literalness is not the norm of language use as is often assumed (e.g. 
Grice's Maxim of Quality), but rather a limited case of language use. Now we 
are going to introduce a relevance notion of literal interpretation which is a 
necessary notion in utterance interpretation. 
clusions about the world. Now logicalfom is the output of the linguistic input system Le., 
grammar, and this is fed into the central systems in which inferences are performed on it, 
completing it into propositionalform with background information. 
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4. Literal interpretation in relevance theory 
In relevance theory, literalness is defined in terms of the relationship benveen 
the thought of the speaker and her utterance. When its propositional form 
shares identical logical and contextual implications with the propositional 
form of the speaker's thought, the utterance is considered to be a literal inter- 
pretation of the speaker's thought. 
Here the term interpretation is used to mean that the propositional form 
is not used to represent states of affairs in the world, but it is used to repre- 
sent other propositional forms. And the relation between the two proposi- 
tional forms is not one of truth, but one of resemblance. 
For example, in the following metaphor (7) and an irony (8), the propo- 
sitional forms that Mary is an angel, and that Tokyo is a beautiful town are 
not part of the speaker's thoughts, i.e., the speaker does not believe them to 
be true. 
(7) (metaphor) M a y  ir an angel. 
( 8 )  (irony) Tokyo is a beautzfil town. 
Here implicatures such as Mary is a very kind person, and as Tokyo is an 
ugly town, are part of the speaker's thought, but the explicitly expressed pro- 
positional forms are not. So we can say that these utterances are not a case of 
literal interpretation of the speaker's thought. 
However, as was mentioned, the notion of literal interpretation can be con- 
trasted not only with figurative utterances, but also with what Sperber & 
Wilson (1986) cal1 loose taM Examples (9)-(10) are cases of loose talk 
(9) It will take an hour by train. 
( 1  0 )  1 Live 20 miles west of Tokyo. 
Suppose that the speaker knows that it will take 57 minutes by train and that 
she lives 19 miles west of Tokyo. But she utters (9)-(10) to give the hearer an 
idea of distance in order for him to get to the speaker's place in time. Here the 
exact number is not relevant and it is quite clear to the hearer that the speak- 
er is not claiming that it will take exactly an hour, or that the speaker lives 
exactly 20 miles west ofTokyo. These utterances are not figurative utterances 
and traditionally considered to be literal utterances. However, (9) and (10) 
are, strictly speaking, false statements and intended to be understood as less 
than literal: i.e., certain logical implications that follow from the propositions 
expressed will not be part of what is communicated. 
The notion of literal interpretation makes sense as here we can talk about 
a more or less literal interpretation of (9)-(10). The speaker does not believe the 
truth of the propositional forms given by (9)-(lo), i.e., the propositional forms 
are not part of the speaker's thought. However, their propositional forms share 
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with the speaker's thought many implications such as the speaker's house is 
not near and the hearer has to allow a good time to get there in time. So the pro- 
positional forms of the utterances do not share al1 implications, but they do 
share many implications. 
Sperber & Wilson (1986) cal1 al1 the utterances (7)-(10) cases of loose talk 
which is a less than strictl~ literal interpretation. Now facing non-figurative 
loose talk examples such as (9)-(lo), we are forced to cast doubt on the tradi- 
tional view that the speaker is following the norm of literalness, i.e., the maxim 
of truthfulness. What the speaker is aiming at is in fact not literal truth, but 
optimal relevance as advocated by Sperber & Wilson (1986). 
Lastly, the notion of literal interpretation has its theoretical role since this 
is an extreme case and is contrasted with another extreme case in which the 
propositional form of an utterance and the speaker's thought share no logical 
and contextual implications. We believe that these extreme cases are very rare 
in human communication, however, utterance interpretation lies between these 
two extremes. That is, the propositional form of an utterance shares some but 
not al1 of the logical and contextual implications of the speaker's thought. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, Katz's notion of literal meaning was contrasted with Searle's; the 
former can be characterized as context-free grammatically determined mean- 
ing while the latter, as contextually enriched propositional meaning of a sen- 
tence. We have said that these two notions are in fact attributed to two different 
conceptions of semantic competence: Katz's semantic competence is a com- 
ponent of linguistic competence, i.e., a part of grammatical knowledge, and 
is autonomous from other cognitive capacities; Searle's, on the other hand, is 
knowledge of truth-conditions. 
Katz's and Searle's notions of literal meaning are captured in terms of logi- 
calform and propositionalform respectivel~ in relevaiice theory, and have their 
places in utterance interpretation processes. That is, the hearer's knowledge of 
grammar decodes an utterance into a logicalform, Katz's notion, which is then 
contextually enriched into apropositionalform, Searle's notion. 
In this paper, we have also argued that the notion of literal meaning of a 
sentence itself does not enter into any distinction with any other variety of 
a meaning such as metaphor, irony, etc. that a sentence can have. Instead, we 
have argued that it is a relevance-based notion of literal intelpretation that can 
make the distinction. That is, this notion can not only be contrasted with 
figurative use (e.g. (7) and (8)) but also with non-figurative loose use of language 
(e.g. (9) and (10)). 
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